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TURNING A GOVERNMENT SEARCH INTO A PERMANENT
POWER: THORNTON V. UNITED STATES AND THE
"PROGRESSIVE DISTORTION" OF
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
George Dery*
Michael J. Hernandez**
INTRODUCTION
A member of Congress once lamented, "It has been said that if one dies and
goes to heaven and wants to come back to Earth and have eternal life, come back
as a federal program."' The simple logic behind this reasoning seems unassailable.
Once the federal government creates a program which offers a certain class of
individuals a benefit, it has simultaneously created an interest group that will seek
to maintain or even increase that benefit. Those who do not receive the largess,
being too diffuse and disorganized, cannot stop the flow of federal dollars. The
government program, therefore, endures and grows even if the original purpose for
the entitlement has ceased to exist.
Perhaps such immortality also favors the Supreme Court's grant of search rights
to police. Once the Court has created an exception to the Fourth Amendment's limits
on government powers,2 that license to search not only persists, but grows over time,
regardless of the original exigencies that caused the Court to craft the rule in the first
place. When Carroll v. United States3 created the automobile exception enabling
* Professor, California State University Fullerton, Division of Politics, Administration,
and Justice; Former Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, California; J.D., 1987, Loyola
Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., 1983, University of California Los Angeles. The authors
would like to thank their research assistant, Marisa Duggan, B.A., 2005, Communications,
California State University Fullerton.
** Deputy District Attorney III, Office ofthe District Attorney, Orange County, California;
J.D., 1997, Southwestern University School of Law, Los Angeles; B.A., 1993, California
State University Fullerton.
' Mary K. Muth, The Fable ofthe Bees Revisited: Causes and Consequences ofthe US.
Honey Program, 46 J.L. & Econ. 479,479 (2003) (quoting Rep. Harris W. Fawell (R.-Ill.)).
2 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
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police to immediately search cars at the scene of a stop, this police right flourished
in Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence. First, the automobile exception was expanded
to allow searches of vehicles not only on the street, but also when they are safely
secured at police stations.4 Next, police were enabled to search not only the car
itself, but any "containers" found within.5 Likewise, when the Court found special
needs to allow school officials to search the purses of students they suspected of
rule breaking or criminality, 6 this right to search grew into a government right to
randomly drug test student athletes' urine.7 This official intrusion, in turn, spread
beyond athletes to include urinalysis of any student participating in extracurricular
activities, such as the Vocal Club or Future Farmers of America.8
The Court has now continued this pattern with yet another government search
right, the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Like a
government subsidy, the search incident to arrest was designed in Chimel v.
California to meet particular needs.9 It then was expanded in New York v. Belton
for arrests of occupants of a car.' Now, in Thornton v. United States, the Court has
extended search incident to arrest once again to apply when an officer first meets
a person outside a vehicle." Thornton's expansion of search incident to arrest is of
particular concern because its logical inconsistencies and its confused rule have
created uncertainty regarding the warrant exception's purpose and scope.
This Article begins, in Part I, with a review of the background of the search in-
cident to arrest rule and its foundations, justifications, and scope. Part II assesses
Thornton - its facts, lower court litigation, and the Court's decision. In Part III,
this Article examines the Court's analysis and considers the implications of its new
ruling.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Warrant Requirement
Government violation of a person's privacy is such a serious act that it should
occur only after sober consideration by an official who is separated from the
4 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970).
5 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982).
6 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985); see also id. at 351 (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (reinforcing the Court's holding)..
' Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663-64 (1995).
8 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,830-31 (2002). See also Earls' prior history. Earls
v. Bd. ofEduc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1282 (W.D. Okla. 2000), rev'd, 242 F.3d 1264(10th
Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
9 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (stating there is justification for the search of the arrestee's
person and area within his immediate control).
10 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
"' 541 U.S. 615, 619 (2004).
[Vol. 14:677
2005] TURNING A GOVERNMENT SEARCH INTO A PERMANENT POWER
passions of the particular case. Such reasoning has guided the Court at least since
the 1914 case Weeks v. United States,2 where the Court declared clearly that the
United States Marshal "[c]ould only have invaded the house of the accused when
armed with a warrant issued as required by the Constitution, upon sworn informa-
tion, and describing with reasonable particularity the thing for which the search was
to be made."'" The Weeks Court condemned the warrantless action in the case as
"without sanction of law.' 4
InAgnello v. United States, 5 the Court reaffirmed the warrant mandate, warning:
"Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling
house, furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant. And
such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing
probable cause."' 6 The Court explained the rationale behind the warrant preference
in United States v. Leflowitz: 17
The informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates
empowered to issue warrants as to what searches and seizures
are permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over
the hurried action of officers and others who may happen to
make arrests. Security against unlawful searches is more likely
to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance upon
the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under the
excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of
crime. "
Justice Douglas, in McDonald v. United States,9 was even more candid in
ruling that "there must be compelling reasons to justify the absence of a search
warrant., 20 He reasoned that "[t]he right of privacy was deemed too precious to
entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest
of criminals," and he bluntly concluded, "Power is a heady thing; and history shows
that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted."'"
The justices of the Court thus interpreted the Fourth Amendment as having a
warrant requirement because they recognized a simple fact of human nature: those
12 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
'" Id. at 393.
14 Id.
1" 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
16 Id. at 33.
'7 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
Id. at 464.
'9 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
20 Id. at 454.
21 Id. at 455-56.
679
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
emotionally invested in catching a person who they believe to be a criminal will not
have that individual's rights as their first priority. The pressure to rush to act might
even be increased by the fact that a particular officer or agency might not be the only
one pursuing the criminal, and the attendant recognition and resources may encourage
unlawful shortcuts.2 In order, therefore, to ensure that the Fourth Amendment is
upheld even under such stressful circumstances, a detached and neutral magistrate has
to be placed between the individual and the police aiming to intrude on his or her
rights. 23
The warrant requirement became such a mainstay of Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence that it moved the Court, as early as 1951, to note that "[o]ver and again this
Court has emphasized that the mandate of the Amendment requires adherence to
judicial processes." 24 In Katz v. United States,2 the Court went so far as to create a
presumption of Fourth Amendment violation when police intruded on privacy in the
absence of a warrant.26 Katz thus characterized searches "conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate" as "per se unreason-
able under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions. 27
The Court has, therefore, over a series of decades, reaffirmed and thus solidified
its warrant requirement. The warrant preference has been applied in all manner of
contexts, including cars,28 phone booths,29 blood samples,30 state hospital offices,3'
hotel rooms,32 and clothing pockets.33 The warrant mandate is not, however,
22 In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948), the Court explicitly acknowl-
edged such competition by noting:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its pro-
tection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
23 Id. at 14; see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,481-82 (1963) (declaring
that the Fourth Amendment required "that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial
officer ... be interposed between the citizen and the police").
24 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
25 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
26 Id. at 357.
27 Id. (footnote omitted).
28 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
29 Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
30 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
31 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
32 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
33 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
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without exceptions.34 One such exception is the officer's right to search incident
to arrest, the subject of the next section.
B. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception to the Warrant Mandate
1. The Establishment of the Current General Standard of Search Incident to
Arrest in Chimel
In Weeks, one of the early cases championing the warrant requirement, the Court
also acknowledged that the right "to search the person of the accused when legally
arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime" had been "always
recognized under English and American law."35 Despite such claim to ancient ori-
gins, the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant mandate has rarely provided
the Court simple answers as to its boundaries. In Chimel v. California,36 the Court's
seminal search incident to arrest case, the Court waded through decades of precedent,
which it charitably characterized as "far from consistent."37 A statement nearer the
truth would have to acknowledge not just inconsistency in the exception's scope, but
also confusion regarding its very purpose and weakness in its foundation, based at
least in part on dicta.
Unlike the essential questions about the basis, purpose, and scope of the search
incident to arrest rule, the facts in the Chimel case were straightforward and undisput-
ed.38 Santa Ana, California, police officers arrived at Chimel's home one afternoon
with a warrant for Chimel's arrest for the burglary of a coin shop.39 When police
" Indeed, the warrant requirement has not been without critics. In United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), the Court cast doubt on its own warrant mandate by
contending:
It is appropriate to note that the Constitution does not say that the right
of the people to be secure in their persons should not be violated
without a search warrant if it is practicable for the officers to procure
one. The mandate of the Fourth Amendment is that the people shall be
secure against unreasonable searches. It is not disputed that there may
be reasonable searches, incident to an arrest, without a search warrant.
... The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search
warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. That criterion in turn
depends upon the facts and circumstances - the total atmosphere of
the case.
Id. at 65-66. Rabinowitz ultimately failed to carry the day, for in Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969), the Court held that Rabinowitz was "no longer to be followed." Id. at 768.
31 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
36 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
37 Id. at 755.
38 Id. at 753.
39 Id.
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knocked on the door and asked to come in, Chimel's wife let them inside to wait for
some minutes until her husband came home from work.4 ° When Chimel arrived,
one of the officers "handed him the arrest warrant and asked for permission to 'look
around.""'4 When Chimel refused, the police informed him that, "'on the basis of
the lawful arrest,' the officers would nonetheless conduct a search," despite the lack
of consent or search warrant.42 The police then searched "the entire three-bedroom
house, including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop." '43 In the master
bedroom and sewing room, officers directed Chimel's wife to "open drawers and
'to physically move contents of the drawers from side to side so that [they] might
view any items that would have come from [the] burglary."'" The search, lasting
between forty-five minutes and an hour, revealed some coins, medals, and tokens.45
At trial, Chimel objected to the admission of the recovered items, arguing they
were seized in violation of the Constitution.46 The lower courts allowed the evi-
dence in, holding that the search of the home was justified as incident to arrest.47
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stewart, was thus presented with an
attic-to-garage search justified as incident to an arrest that occurred as much as an
hour earlier in the front of the home.48 In deciding whether all the aspects of this
ambitious intrusion could be wedged within search incident to arrest, the Court took
on the challenge of defining the boundaries of this warrant exception.49 In doing so,
the Chimel Court assumed the unenviable task of trying to make sense out of some
half century of search incident to arrest case law. 0
Starting what would become a theme for search incident to arrestjurisprudence,
Justice Stewart in Chimel traced the Court's first approval of the warrant exception
to dictum offered in Weeks.51 He noted that the Weeks Court only made reference
to search incident to arrest as a way of explaining how the United States Marshal's
actions in that case fell short of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. 2 On this point,
Justice Day in Weeks could not have been plainer, inquiring, "What then is the pres-
ent case? Before answering that inquiry specifically, it may be well by a process
of exclusion to state what it is not. It is not an assertion of the right ... to search
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 753-54.
41 Id. at 754.
44 Id.
45 id.
46 Id
41 Id. at 754-55.
48 Id. at 753-55.
49 Id. at 755.
50 Id. at 755-60.
SId. at 755.
52 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
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the person of the accused when legally arrested.,1 3 Further, in this first discussion,
the Court mentioned merely the government's right to "discover and seize the fruits
or evidences of crime."54 Thus, in its initial foray into search incident to arrest, the
Court failed to delineate any place beyond the person open to official inspection and
offered only the need to secure evidence as a rationale for the intrusion.5
Chimel noted further that, in Carroll v. United States,56 decided over a decade
after Weeks, the Court offered the following "embellishment" of Weeks dictum:
"When a man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person
or in his control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to
prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution." 7
Therefore, the Court in Carroll not only cited dictum as if it were a holding, but
expanded it to encompass a search not only of the arrestee's body but of a vague
area within his "control.""8 Once on a building boom, the Court, only "a few
months later,"5 9 expanded the search incident to arrest rule by adding still more
dictum to an already shaky foundation in Agnello v. United States.60 The Agnello
Court declared that the right to search incident to arrest, not only of the arrestee's
person, but also "the place where the arrest is made" was "not to be doubted.",6'
Moreover, such an invasion enabled police to target "weapons and other things to
effect an escape from custody" as well as "fruits" of crime.62 The subject matter of
the search, therefore, miraculously expanded, despite the fact that such a discussion
was beyond the holding of the case.
Lacking the full analysis that comes only with a reasoned holding, the search
incident to arrest dicta was subject, as noted by Justice Stewart in Chimel, to drastic
swings of the pendulum.63 In Marron v. United States,6 the Court upheld the warrant-
less seizure of a bootlegging ledger rationalizing that, as a search incident to arrest,
the federal prohibition agents could "search the place in order to find and seize
things used to carry on the criminal enterprise. "65 Justice Butler, writing for the
Marron Court, characterized official authority as extending "to all parts of the
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
" Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-56 (1969) (emphasis in original) (quoting
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158).
58 Id.
'9 Id. at 756.
60 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
61 Id. at 30.
62 Id.
63 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 758.
64 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
61 Id. at 199.
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premises used for the unlawful purpose. 66 Yet, any officer relying on this broad
language would be disappointed by the Court's next incarnation of search incident
to arrest in Go-Bart Importing v. United States.67 In Go-Bart, the Court once again
was faced with a search by prohibition agents. 68 The Go-Bart Court was troubled
that agents "falsely claimed to have a warrant for the search of the premises" and
further used "threat of force" to have the arrestees open a "desk and the safe...,
ransacking the desk, safe, filing cases and other parts of the office" for a "general
exploratory search." '69 It thus distinguished the search in Marron as limited to
things "visible and accessible and in the offender's immediate custody."70 Go-Bart
made a point of noting that the agents in Marron committed no "general search or
rummaging of the place."'" The Court reaffirmed this limited view of search in-
cident to arrest in United States v. Lejkowitz,72 where it condemned a search of two
desks and a "towel cabinet" in "room 604," a space of only ten-by-twenty feet,73 as
being "unrestrained, '74 "exploratory," and "general."75
After deeming the search of only a single room ("room 604") to be violative of
the Fourth Amendment in Leftcowitz, the Court next found, in Harris v. United
States,76 a five-hour "careful and thorough search"77 of a four-room apartment to be
a "basically reasonable" search incident to arrest.78 In Harris, five agents, each
assigned to a particular room, searched the living room, bedroom, bathroom, and
kitchen after arresting and handcuffing Harris in his living room. 79 Justice Vinson,
writing for the Harris majority, declared that a search incident to arrest could
extend to "include the premises under [the arrestee's] immediate control," and so
police could search "the place where the arrest is made."' Harris made clear that
the "place" referred to included the entire premises because the arrestee "was in
exclusive possession of a four room apartment," and, therefore, his control "extended
quite as much to the bedroom," where the incriminating evidence was found, as to the
living room where he was arrested.8' The arrestee's actual reach was not a relevant
6 id.
67 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
68 Id. at 348-50.
69 Id. at 358.
70 Id.
71 id.
72 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
73 Id. at 458-59.
74 Id. at 464.
71 Id. at 465.
76 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
77 Id. at 149.
78 Id. at 155.
79 Id. at 148-49.
80 Id. at 151.
81 Id. at 152.
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factor, for "the area which reasonably may be subjected to search is not to be
determined by the fortuitous circumstance that the arrest took place in the living
room as contrasted to some other room of the apartment.
8 2
One year later, in spite of Harris, the Court again found itself limiting search
incident to arrest in Trupiano v. United States. 3 In Trupiano, acting on weeks of
inside information that an illegal distillery was manufacturing alcohol, agents raided
a farm without securing a search warrant.8 ' The agents seized "a still, alcohol, mash
and other equipment."85 The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Murphy,
bridled at allowing in the evidence under search incident to arrest, which it saw as
a "strictly limited right."86 The majority in Trupiano saw search incident to arrest
as growing "out of the inherent necessities of the situation at the time of the
arrest. 87 Justice Murphy refused to let "the mere fact that there is a valid arrest"
automatically "legalize a search or seizure without a warrant," for this would enable
the exception to swallow the warrant requirement rule. 8 Because the officers
showed such "indifference to the legal process" here,89 the Court deemed the
evidence "improperly seized."90
Merely two years after limiting search incident to arrest in Trupiano, the Court
sought yet again to loosen the restraints on the warrant exception in United States
v. Rabinowitz.91 In Rabinowitz, a postal inspector received information that the
defendant was dealing in stamps bearing forged overprints.92 Armed with an arrest
warrant, federal officers arrested the defendant at his place of business and then
proceeded to search his one-room office.93 An hour and a half search of a "desk,
safe, and file cabinets" resulted in the recovery of 573 stamps.94 In considering the
legality of this search, Justice Minton, who wrote the majority opinion, noted,
"What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula," for "in
our discipline we have no ready litmus-paper test."95 The Rabinowitz Court, however,
found the search reasonable as incident to arrest because of the following factors:
82 Id.
83 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
' Id. at 701-03.
5 Id. at 703.
86 Id. at 708.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 710.
9' 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
92 Id. at 57; see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 759 (1969).
93 Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 58-59.
9 Id. at 59.
95 Id. at 63.
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(1) the search and seizure were incident to a valid arrest; (2) the
place of the search was a business room to which the public,
including the officers, was invited; (3) the room was small and
under the immediate and complete control of respondent; (4) the
search did not extend beyond the room used for unlawful
purposes; (5) the possession of the forged and altered stamps
was a crime .... "
Justice Minton's factors-of-reasonableness approach ran counter to the Court's
long-standing adherence to the warrant requirement.
The opinion in Rabinowitz explicitly recognized as much when it asserted for
searches incident to arrest, "such searches turn upon the reasonableness under all
the circumstances and not upon the practicability of procuring a search warrant, for
the warrant is not required."97 Justice Minton, therefore, was not merely attempting
to enlarge the scope of search incident to arrest, but to free it from the greater
restraint of a warrant requirement.98
Thus, in deciding whether the search of Chimel's home fell within the scope of
search incident to arrest, the Court had inherited a tangled mess of conflicting cases.
In writing for the Chimel Court, Justice Stewart responded by returning to basics.
He recalled the "background and purpose of the Fourth Amendment," identifying
the Crown's abuses of the colonists' security against unreasonable search and
seizure as "one of the potent causes of the Revolution."'99 Indeed, the Fourth
Amendment "was in large part a reaction to the general warrants and warrantless
searches that had so alienated the colonists and had helped speed the movement for
independence."' 00 The warrant requirement was not, therefore, a mere formality,
but such "a crucial part" of the Amendment that Justice Stewart declared, "We
cannot be true to that constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search
warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional
mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative."' 0 '
Chimel viewed the warrant mandate as so crucial that it placed the burden on the
government seeking exemption from it."2
Moreover, Justice Stewart emphasized that any exception so allowed would be
narrowly construed because the "'scope of a search must be "strictly tied to and
justified by" the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."" 3 With
the guiding principals of departing from a warrant only when circumstances made
96 Id. at 64.
9' Id. at 65-66.
98 Id.
9 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760-61 (1969). See also Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at
69 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
',o Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761.
101 Id.
'02 Id. at 762.
103 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
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it "imperative" and limiting any resulting intrusion to its original justification,
Chimel determined the "proper extent" of search incident to arrest."' Upon an
arrest, it was reasonable for the officer to "search the person arrested in order to
remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape."'0° Anything less would endanger the officer and frustrate the
arrest. ' 6 Additionally, it was "entirely reasonable for the... officer to search for
and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment
or destruction."'1 7 Finally, police could search not just a person, but "the area into
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items."108
The Court was aware that a weapon on a table or in a drawer near the arrestee could
"be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the
person arrested."'0 9 Such common sense considerations led to limit a search inci-
dent to arrest to "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control'
- construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.""' 0
Justice Stewart found "no comparable justification, however, for routinely
searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs - or, for that matter,
for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that
room itself."' Any further intrusions would require "no less" than "adherence to
thejudicial process" envisioned in the warrant mandate." 2 Finally, recognizing that
Harris and Rabinowitz were inconsistent with Chimel's disciplined treatment of
search incident to arrest, Justice Stewart declared that these two cases were "no
longer to be followed."' '13 In thus crafting its rule defining search incident to
arrest's scope, the Court in Chimel hoped to bring order to an area of law burdened
with a half century of confusion and inconsistency.
2. Belton's "Bright-Line" Test for Searching Passenger Compartments of
Vehicles Incident to Arrest
Over a decade after Chimel had rationalized the conflicting rules regarding the
scope of search incident to arrest in buildings, the Court had to confront the boundaries
of this same warrant exception in relation to cars in New York v. Belton.'" In Belton,
104 id.
'0' Id. at 763.
106 Id.
107 id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
"10 Id.
11' Id.
112 Id.
13 Id. at 768.
14 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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New York State Trooper Douglas Nicot stopped a vehicle for speeding and
discovered that none of its four occupants owned the car or was related to the
owner." 5 Further, Officer Nicot "smelled burnt marihuana" and saw on the car's
floor a "'Supergold' [wrapper] that he associated with marihuana.""' 6 He ordered
the men out of the car, arrested them, patted them down, and finally "split them up
into four separate areas of the Thruway at this time so they would not be in physical
touching area of each other."' 7 Trooper Nicot then recovered the Supergold
envelope, which was holding marijuana, searched each man on the Thruway, and
then searched "the passenger compartment of the car."'" On the car's backseat, the
trooper found a black leatherjacket belonging to Roger Belton, one of the car's four
prior occupants." 9  Unzipping the jacket's pocket, he found and recovered
cocaine. 2'
The Court in Belton thus had to determine the scope of a search incident to
arrest of a person stopped by police while in a car. Justice Stewart, writing for the
Court, began essentially as he had in Chimel by noting, "It is a first principle of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the police may not conduct a search unless
they first convince a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to do so." ' He
then recognized the search incident to arrest exception to this warrant requirement
but worried that "courts have discovered the principle difficult to apply in specific
cases."'
122
Belton then struck a practical note, declaring that Fourth Amendment protection
could "'only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most
instances, make it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to
whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement. '123
Since the Fourth Amendment "'is primarily intended to regulate the police in their
day-to-day activities,"' it should be "'expressed in terms that are readily applicable
by the police in the context of the law enforcement activities in which they are
necessarily engaged. ',124 Justice Stewart sought to avoid a "highly sophisticated
set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of
subtle nuances and hairline distinctions," for it might be "literally impossible of
application by the officer in the field."' 2
"1d. at 455.
d6 1dat 455-56.
" Id. at 456.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 457.
122 Id. at 458.
123 Id. (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication " Versus "Standardized
Procedures ": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REv. 127, 142).
124 Id. (quoting LaFave, supra note 123, at 141).
125 Id.
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The solution lay instead in a "single, familiar standard" for officers "who have
only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual
interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront."'2 6 Priority was thus
placed on a rule that would be "straightforward..., easily applied, and predictably
enforced."' 27 In an effort to construct a "workable definition," Belton offered the
following generalization: "articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the
passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably,
within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary ite[m]."" 28 The Court, therefore, held that "when a policeman has made
a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contempora-
neous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." 2 9
Included in the scope of this search is any container found in the passenger compart-
ment, "whether open or closed."' 3
Seemingly self-conscious about being seen as undoing all of Chimel's hard
work, Justice Stewart defended Belton as doing nothing more than determining "the
meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic context," rather
than altering that seminal case's "fundamental principles" in any way. 3' Belton's
expansion, as will be seen, was only one of several to be imposed on search incident
to arrest doctrine.
II. THORNTON v. UNITED STA TES
A. Facts
In the late morning of July 21, 2001, "Officer Deion L. Nichols was patrolling
Sewells Point Road in Norfolk, Virginia, in an unmarked police car .... ,,3  Officer
Nichols's suspicions were aroused by a "gold car" he observed driving in a
"suspicious manner."' 33  Specifically, while stopped at a traffic light, Officer
Nichols noticed that the gold-colored car would "not pull up next to his car."'3 4 He
126 Id. (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1978)).
127 Id. at 459.
.28 Id. at 460 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
129 Id. (citations omitted).
130 Id. at 460-61.
, Id. at 460 n.3.
132 Brief for the United States at 2, Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004) (No.
03-5165) [hereinafter United States' Brief]. See also Brief for Petitioner at 2, Thornton v.
United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004) (No. 03-5165) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
133 See United States' Brief, supra note 132, at 2.
134 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 132, at 2. Officer Nichols assumed that the driver's
failure to "come all the way up to [him]" was due to the motorist's suspicion that he was a
police officer. United States v. Thornton, 325 F.3d 189, 190 (4th Cir. 2003), aftfd, 541 U.S.
689
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therefore drove onto a side street and turned around so that he could position his car
behind the gold vehicle.'35 Officer Nichols then observed Marcus Thornton's gold
Lincoln Town Car, followed it, and "ran the tag." '136 This computer check revealed
that the license plates were issued to a 1982 Chevrolet two door car, instead of the
Lincoln Town Car.'3 7 Officer Nichols then pursued the Lincoln, planning on
pulling it over, but, before he could make a traffic stop, Thornton turned into a
shopping center and parked his car.
38
Officer Nichols pulled behind the Lincoln 3 9 and approached Thornton as he
was walking toward the stores.1 40 Officer Nichols, in uniform, told Thornton that
his license plates did not match his vehicle and asked to see his driver's license.' 41
Thornton, sweating and appearing nervous, licked his lips and rambled about how
"someone had just given him the car."'142 When, for "officer safety,"'143 Officer
Nichols inquired whether Thornton had any narcotics or weapons, he replied, "no"
and consented to a pat-down for weapons.'" During the pat-down, Officer Nichols
felt a "bulge of squishy material" in Thornton's left front pocket.'45 Officer Nichols
again asked if Thornton was carrying narcotics, and this time he responded that he
had a "bag of weed."' 46 When Officer Nichols then requested that Thornton remove
the bag, Thornton produced one bag of marijuana and another of crack cocaine.147
615 (2004).
... Petitioner's Brief, supra note 132, at 2.
136 Id. at 3. There appeared to be some uncertainty about whether Thornton's Lincoln
Town Car was the same vehicle that had aroused Officer Nichols's suspicion. See United
States' Brief, supra note 132, at 2 n. 1, where it was noted:
When Officer Nichols ran the computer check on petitioner's Lincoln,
he believed that it was the same gold car that he had just observed
being driven on Sewells Point Road in a suspicious manner. He later
became "unsure," however, "whether the gold Lincoln Town Car he
managed to get behind was the one that first aroused his suspicion."
Id.
13" Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 618 (2004).
138 United States' Brief, supra note 132, at 2.
139 Id. at 3.
"~ Petitioner's Brief, supra note 132, at 3.
"41 United States' Brief, supra note 132, at 3.
142 Id.; Thornton, 541 U.S. at 618. Thornton later explained his sweating due to "the heat
of the July day." Petitioner's Brief, supra note 132, at 3.
"13 Thornton v. United States, 325 F.3d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 2003), aff'd, 541 U.S. 615
(2004).
'44 United States' Brief, supra note 132, at 3.
'41 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 132, at 3.
'" United States' Brief, supra note 132, at 3.
14' Id. Specifically, Officer Nichols found bags of "green leafy material consistent with
marijuana" as well as a bag with a "large amount of an off-white rocklike substance consis-
tent with crack cocaine." Thornton, 325 F.3d at 191.
[Vol. 14:677
2005] TURNING A GOVERNMENT SEARCH INTO A PERMANENT POWER 691
Officer Nichols arrested Thornton, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of
the police car.14' Officer Nichols then walked over to Thornton's car and searched
it, finding a loaded semi-automatic "Bry-Co nine millimeter handgun" under the
driver's seat. 49 On the drive to the police station, Thornton volunteered that he had
"just robbed some cat out at Ocean View, and that's where he got the dope."' 5
On December 12,2001, a federal grand jury charged Thornton with possession
with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),
and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). 5' Before trial, Thornton moved to suppress the drugs,
statement, and firearm.'52 The district court denied the motion, finding, in part, that
Officer Nichols lawfully searched the vehicle incident to arrest and, in the
alternative, that Officer Nichols could have recovered the pistol pursuant to an
inventory search."' After a two-day trial, the jury convicted Thornton on all three
counts.
5 4
B. Lower Court Rulings
Thornton appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
on the "sole contention" that Belton's search incident to arrest exception required
Officer Nichols to "initiate... contact with Thornton, either by actually confronting
Thornton, or signaling confrontation with Thornton, while Thornton was still in his
vehicle.""' After a review of Chimel and Belton, the court, in an opinion authored
by Circuit Judge Diana Gribbon Motz, focused on Thornton's argument that he was
not an "occupant of an automobile" when Officer Nichols first confronted him, and,
therefore, fell outside of the Belton rule.'56 Judge Motz noted that the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in United States v. Hudgins,' held that where an "officer initiates
contact with the defendant, either by [actual confrontation] ... or by signaling
confrontation..., while the defendant is still in the automobile," any later search
of the vehicle's "passenger compartment falls within the scope of Belton and will
be upheld as reasonable."' If instead, the defendant "has voluntarily exited the
'48 United States' Brief, supra note 132, at 3.
149 Thornton, 325 F.3d at 191.
150 Id.
151 Id,
152 id.
153 Id.
'54 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 619 (2004).
' Thornton, 325 F.3d at 191-92.
156 See id at 193.
7 52 F.3d 115 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 891 (1995).
158 Thornton, 325 F.3d at 193 (quoting Hudgins, 52 F.3d at 119).
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automobile and begun walking away from the automobile before the officer has
initiated contact with him, the case does not fit within Belton 's bright-line rule."'
The case would then be governed by a "case-by-case analysis" of Chimel's general
rule. 1
60
Judge Motz then noted that no consensus existed among the other courts of
appeals as to whether to follow the Hudgins rule. 6 ' State courts were likewise
divided in struggling with this issue. 162 The Thornton court, therefore, felt free to
reject Hudgins' "initiate contact" limitation of Belton.163 Judge Motz marshaled a
series of points to support this holding. First, although the Supreme Court had not
ruled on the issue, dicta in Michigan v. Long' seemed to indicate that police could
search a vehicle incident to arrest "even if the officer has not initiated contact while
the arrestee was still in the automobile.' 65 In Long, patrol officers had seen a
speeding car swerve to a stop in a ditch.' 66 When officers reached the scene, Long
was already out of his car and at the rear of the vehicle. 67 Under these circum-
stances, the Long Court concluded, "It is clear... that if the officers had arrested
Long... they could have searched the passenger compartment [under Belton]."68
Judge Motz, moreover, thought that Hudgins's contact-in-car rule ran counter
to the "historical rationales" of the search incident to arrest exception. 169 The needs
to disarm the arrestee and to preserve evidence existed "regardless of whether the
arrestee [exited] the automobile voluntarily or because of confrontation with an
officer." 70 Judge Motz further worried that Hudgins's limit on Belton could under-
mine the officer safety rationale and, therefore, "could very well endanger an
officer."' 7' In particular, the Fourth Circuit fretted:
[W]hen encountering a dangerous suspect, it may often be much
safer for officers to wait until the suspect has exited a vehicle
before signaling their presence, thereby depriving the suspect of
any weapons he may have in his vehicle, the protective cover of
'5 Id. (emphasis added by 4th Cir.) (quoting Hudgins, 52 F.3d at 119).
'60 Id. (quoting Hudgins, 52 F.3d at 119).
161 Id. at 194.
162 See id.
163 id.
164 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
165 Thornton, 325 F.3d at 194.
166 Long, 463 U.S. at 1035.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1035 n.1.
169 Thornton, 325 F.3d at 195.
17o Id. (quoting Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116 (1998)).
171 Id.
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the vehicle, and the possibility of using the vehicle itself as
either a weapon or a means of flight. 72
Judge Motz thus would not force "officers to choose between forfeiting the oppor-
tunity to preserve evidence.., and increasing the risk to their own lives and the
lives of others."
73
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged, in rejecting the contact-in-car rule, that a
concern existed that "Belton... cannot be stretched so as to render it limitless by
permitting officers to search any vehicle from which an arrestee has emerged,
regardless of how much time has elapsed since his exit or how far he is from the
vehicle when arrested.' ' 74 Judge Motz offered a formulation that Thornton was
"positively linked" to his vehicle prior to arrest.' 71 Such a limit would require
"close proximity, both temporally and spatially.' 7' The Fourth Circuit, however,
failed to offer a clear definition of its "positive link" space and time boundary for
Belton's bright-line rule.
C. The Supreme Court's Thornton Decision
The Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, approached
Thornton as a case determining the limits of Belton. 77 Indeed, the Chief Justice
referred to two previous missed opportunities to decide "whether Belton's rule is
limited to situations where the officer makes contact with the occupant while the
occupant is inside the vehicle, or whether it applies as well when the officer first
makes contact with the arrestee after the latter has stepped out of his vehicle.' 78
The Thornton Court refused to squander this third chance, holding that Belton
"governs even when an officer does not make contact until the person arrested has
left the vehicle."' 179
Chief Justice Rehnquist began the Court's analysis with a brief review of
Belton."8 0 He properly noted that Belton aimed to "lay down a workable rule" for
searches incident to arrest following traffic stops but conceded that Chimel's "'area
immediately surrounding' the arrestee" rule was "difficult to apply in specific
cases."'' Chief Justice Rehnquist completed his Belton overview by restating its
172 Id.
173 id.
114 Id. at 196.
171 Id. (quoting United States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 817 (7th Cir. 1997)).
176 Id.
177 See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004).
178 id.
179 id.
0 See id. at 619.
181 id.
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specific holding that "when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,
search the passenger compartment of that automobile."' 2
The Court in Belton, of course, spoke of "the occupant of an automobile" be-
cause it made its ruling on the facts presented before it in the case.'83 Even Chief
Justice Rehnquist recognized that the officer in Belton first made contact with his
arrestee as a driver behind the wheel of a vehicle.'4 These facts in Belton, however,
were deemed irrelevant by the Thornton Court.8 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist declared,
"[W]e [in Belton] placed no reliance on the fact that the officer in Belton ordered
the occupants out of the vehicle, or initiated contact with them while they remained
within it."' 86 Such circumstances bore "no logical relationship to Belton's rationale,"
for in "all relevant aspects, the arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents
identical concerns regarding officer safety and the destruction of evidence as the arrest
of one who is inside the vehicle."'8 7 Thornton declared that the stress of an arrest "is
no less merely because the arrestee exited his car before the officer initiated contact,
nor is an arrestee less likely to attempt to lunge for a weapon or to destroy evidence
if he is outside of, but still in control of, the vehicle."'
' 88
In applying Belton to arrestees first accosted outside a vehicle, Thornton aimed
to give police a choice of options when confronting a suspect.' 89 Chief Justice
Rehnquist speculated that "[i]n some circumstances it maybe safer and more effective
for officers to conceal their presence from a suspect until he has left his vehicle."'19
Limiting a Belton search to only those situations where an officer initiated contact
with the arrestee while still in the vehicle, however, would remove such an option.
This was because officers who first made contact after a suspect left the car would be
"unable to search the car's passenger compartment in the event of a custodial arrest,
potentially compromising their safety and placing incriminating evidence at risk of
concealment or destruction."'' Chief Justice Rehnquist refused to force police to
take "such a gamble."' 192
Finally, Thornton attempted to head off criticisms of its extension of Belton.193
Responding to Thornton's contention that Belton's bright-line rule would be muddied
by an application to "more than vehicle 'occupants,"' Chief Justice Rehnquist argued
.82 Id. at 620 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981)).
183 Belton, 453 U.S. at 455-56.
4 See Thornton, 541 U.S.at 619.
185 Id. at 621.
186 Id. at 620.
187 Id. at 620-21.
"8 Id. at 621.
189 See id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 621-22.
192 Id. at 622.
See id at 622-24.
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that Belton already extended beyond "occupants" to "recent occupants," for Belton
himself was "not inside the car at the time of the arrest and search; he was standing
on the highway."'" As to what constituted a "recent occupant" of a vehicle, the Court
hedged by making the vague assertion that the question might turn on a person's
"temporal or spatial relationship to the car at the time of the arrest and search."' 95
Although Thornton was not any more definite about this "temporal or spatial relation-
ship," it was clear on one point: "recent occupant" status "certainly [did] not turn on
whether [a person] was inside or outside the car at the moment that the officer first
initiated contact with him."'
Further, Chief Justice Rehnquist aimed to address another concern raised by
Thornton's new rule. He acknowledged that "[t]o be sure, not all contraband in the
passenger compartment is likely to be readily accessible to a 'recent occupant.'197
In particular, it was "unlikely in this case that petitioner could have reached under
the driver's seat for his gun once he was outside of his automobile."', 98 The Court
minimized this flaw by noting that Belton shared it, for "the firearm and the
passenger compartment in general were no more inaccessible than were the contra-
band and the passenger compartment in Belton."' 99 What made up for Thornton's
and Belton's lack of justification in reality was the "need for a clear rule, readily
understood by police officers."2" In any case, Thornton's extension of Belton was
seen as no worse than the defendant's proposed "contact initiation" rule, which
itself would "obfuscate" constitutional limits by requiring officers to make "ad hoc
determinations" in the field.2"' Thus, even though imperfect, Thornton's new rule
entered Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with the roaring endorsement that it was
better than the alternative.
'94 Id. at 622.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 622. The Court, in discussing its "recent occupant" rule, might have been
fortunate that Thornton had not contended that he was too far away in time and place for
Belton to apply in the first place. On this point, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "petitioner
conceded that he was in 'close proximity, both temporally and spatially,' to his vehicle ...."
Id. at 619 (quoting United States v. Thornton, 325 F.3d 189, 196 (4th Cir. 2003)). One can
only speculate as to what the outcome of Thornton would have been if the defendant never
conceded he was close in time and space to the car at the time of arrest.
'9' Id. at 622.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 623.
201 Id.
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IH. CONCERNS CREATED BY THORNTON'S RATIONALES
A. Thornton Undermined Chimel's Efforts to Adhere to the Warrant Require-
ment and to Remain True to its Original Justifications
Thornton cast doubt over much of the careful work accomplished by Chimel.
Justice Stewart, in his meticulous tracking of the swinging pendulum of search
incident to arrest case law in Chimel, °2 took great pains to bring the Court back to
respecting the warrant mandate. 3 He reminded officials seeking to avoid the warrant
requirement that they carried the burden to establish the reasonableness ofwarrantless
intrusions.2 4 Further, the standard to be met was significant, for police could not
dispense with a warrant unless "exigencies" made such a course "imperative. 2 5
Finally, any search resulting from an exception to the warrant mandate had to be
"strictly tied" to its original justifications. 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in expanding the official right of intrusion in Thornton,
appeared to approach search incident to arrest from an entirely different perspective
than Justice Stewart had in Chimel.207 In Thornton, the Court began its discussion
with Belton and Chimel, without any reference to the existence of the warrant
requirement.2 °8 It was as if in the Thornton Court's view, search incident to arrest
could, indeed should, be considered in isolation as a police right to search. The
official license of intrusion was such a given that much of Thornton's opinion
focused not on the standard issue of whether the government had proven that a
search of the passenger compartment was "imperative," but on whether the defendant
could convince the Court that officer safety would be maintained without an ex-
pansion of search rights."3 Chief Justice Rehnquist's focus was, therefore, on state
interests in officer safety and evidence integrity."' He considered whether an officer
meeting a person inside or outside a car created possible differences in the reach of
an arrestee's "immediate control."2 '' Thornton emphasized that the "'danger to the
police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress,
and uncertainty.' 2 12 The Chief Justice considered the officer's viewpoint. in
202 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 757-60 (1969).
203 Id. at 761.
204 Id. at 760-61.
205 See id. (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,455-56 (1948)).
206 Id. at 762 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
201 See United States v. Thornton, 541 U.S. 615, 620-22 (2004).
208 Id. at 619-20.
209 See id. at 621-24.
210 See id. at 621-22.
211 Id. at 620-21.
212 Id. at 621 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,234-35 (1975)) (emphasis
added in Thornton).
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crafting the rule, for he wished to allow for circumstances where officers could
maximize safety and effectiveness.2"' The Court, therefore, replaced its traditional
presumption of unreasonableness in the absence of a warrant with a presumption
of danger to officers, for "' [e]very arrest must be presumed to present a risk of
danger to the arresting officer.' ' '214 The result has been an ugly discordance
between Chimel and Thornton. While Justice Stewart condemned the "routine[]
searching" which occurred in Chimel,2' s Chief Justice Rehnquist in Thornton
deplored having to litigate "in each case the issue of whether or not there was
present one of the reasons supporting the authority" to search.216
Although Justice Stewart would not have approved of Thornton, he certainly
would have recognized its approach. One aspect of Thornton in particular would
have given the Chimel Court an eerie sense of dejj vu. Casting about for support
for its ruling, the Thornton Court noted that Michigan v. Long"7 had indicated that
officers in that case could have committed a Belton search of the car, even though
they had first met the driver only after he had exited his vehicle." 8 Unfortunately,
Long simply did not involve search incident to arrest, and, therefore, Justice
O'Connor's comment on that issue was dictum.219 Justice Stewart would have seen
this reliance on dicta as par for the course for search incident to arrest case law. He
had suffered through such flawed reasoning when reviewing Weeks and Agnello in
his survey of precedent in Chimel.22 °
The concern caused by Thornton's resort to dicta is the same as it was with
Weeks and Agnello - when the Court makes rulings on issues that have not had the
benefit of a full analysis based on litigated facts, the guidance from such holdings
is unclear. Undisciplined asides in Weeks and Agnello led to wide swings in the
interpretation of the scope of search incident to arrest, such as upholding the search
of "all parts of the premises" in one case22' and striking down the search of a single
ten-by-twenty foot room in another.222 Thornton, by leaving behind both Chimel's
case-by-case rule assessing an arrestee's area of immediate control and Belton's
213 See id.
214 Id. (quoting Washington v. Chrisman, 445 U.S. 1, 7 (1982)).
2is See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
216 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 620 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459 (1981)).
217 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
21' Thornton, 541 U.S. at 621; see also Long, 463 U.S. at 1035 & n.1.
219 See Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 n. 14. In Long, the Court held that officers possessing
reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and presently dangerous in a Terry stop
involving an automobile can "frisk" the passenger compartment for weapons. See id. at
1049-50.
220 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755.
221 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
222 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 458, 467 (1932).
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bright-line passenger-compartment-of-a-car-stopped-by-an-officer standard, enters
a similar unknown.
Thornton effectively conceded as much with its reluctant creation of the "recent
occupant," a new class of suspect Thornton was forced to craft in light of its ex-
tension of Belton.223 Since police could now search incident to arrest a vehicle that
a person no longer occupied when an officer made contact, Thornton's new outer
limit of those subject to Belton was the "recent occupant. 224 What exactly con-
stituted a "recent occupant" was unclear, even to the Thornton Court. The most
Chief Justice Rehnquist hazarded to offer as a relevant circumstance that a court
"may" consider was a person's "temporal or spatial relationship to the car at the
time of the arrest and search., 225 As to any specifics regarding exactly what time
and place in relation to the car, Thornton gave only silence. 226 No mention is made
of seconds, minutes, feet, or yards, let alone any reference to particular numbers.
For guidance to future officers, the Court would only specify which criterion not to
consider: recent occupant status "certainly does not turn on whether [a person] was
inside or outside the car at the moment that the officer first initiated contact with
him., 227 The stage is thus now set for needless litigation as to the boundaries of
Thornton's not-so-bright-line rule. Attorneys in the courts and officers on the beat
will struggle in their attempts to determine who qualifies as a "recent occupant" of
a vehicle. The spawning of case after case attempting to clarify the outer boundaries
of Thornton's time and space rule creates the very confusion Belton originally aimed
to avoid.
Thornton thus removed the one factor that could be assessed easily and quickly
by police without reference to measuring by watch or ruler - contact in the car.
Paradoxically, Thornton aimed to preserve Belton's rule by erasing its bright line.
This approach is especially bizarre in light of Thornton's celebration of Belton as
laying down a "workable rule ' 228 which was "clear," "readily understood by
police," and "not depend[ent] on differing estimates., 229 The entire defense in the
first place of Belton's generalized approach was its ease of application by officers
in the field.230 As will be shown in the next section, Thornton, in its expansion of
search incident to arrest not only beyond Chimel's original justifications, but also
beyond Belton, has given the Court the dubious distinction of crafting a rule both
stripped of its original boundaries and of its hoped-for clarity.
223 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 622.
224 See id.
225 See id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 619.
229 Id. at 622-23.
230 Thornton declared that "[t]he need for a clear rule ... justifies the sort of generali-
zation which Belton enunciated." Id.
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B. Thornton's Destruction ofBelton's Clarity Created the Very Danger of New
Ad Hoc Inquiries the Court Sought to Avoid
Thornton, as previously noted, went beyond Belton to include the cars of people
first contacted by police outside of those vehicles, and thus left any hope of a "bright-
line" rule behind. In drawing its passenger compartment boundary, Belton's whole
purpose was to provide a "straightforward rule, easily applied, and predictably
enforced"23' so that the Fourth Amendment could meaningfully "regulate the police
in their day-to-day activities." '232 In pursuing the clarity that comes with a per se rule,
Justice Stewart gave up the precision offered to citizens by a totality of the circum-
stances test for the individual case.233 He conceded that the passenger compartment
was not "inevitably" within "'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to
grab a weapon or evidentiary item." 234 But the lack of surgical exactitude was
compensated for by avoiding a "highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts
of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline
distinctions ... 235
By extending Belton, the Thornton Court has created the worst of both worlds:
it has retained the inaccuracy of Belton's passenger compartment standard while
destroying its ease of application. Thornton has ironically set up a situation inviting
"precisely the sort of ad hoc determinations on the part of officers in the field and
reviewing courts that Belton sought to avoid., 236 This is amply demonstrated by
Chief Justice Rehnquist's attempt to liken police contacts with occupants who have
alighted from a vehicle to contacts with those still inside it.237 He considered the
stress of an arrest to be
no less merely because the arrestee exited his car before the
officer initiated contact, nor is an arrestee less likely to attempt
to lunge for a weapon or to destroy evidence if he is outside of,
but still in control of, the vehicle. In either case, the officer faces
a highly volatile situation. It would make little sense to apply
two different rules to what is, at bottom, the same situation.238
231 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459 (1981).
232 Id. at 458 (quoting LaFave, supra note 123, at 141).
233 Id. at 459-60.
234 Id. at 460 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
235 Id. at 458 (citing LaFave, supra note 123, at 141).
236 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623 (2004) (citing Belton, 453 U.S. at
549-60).
237 Id. at 620-21.
238 Id. at621.
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If stress is the standard, especially in light of the fact that "[e]very arrest must
be presumed to present a risk of danger to the arresting officer," '239 what about the
peril that exists in accosting a suspect when he or she walks up to a car that he or
she is about to drive? Is this not, "[i]n all relevant aspects," a situation which
"presents identical concerns regarding officer safety and the destruction of evidence
as the arrest of one who is inside the vehicle"?240 If this situation falls within the
new rule, does Thornton also cover arrests where people just happen to be walking
past their cars? After all, such owners in all likelihood are in possession of keys to
the vehicle and so could make a lunge for its passenger compartment. Finally, why
limit a Belton search to a car owned or driven by a suspect? Belton itself involved
a case where the vehicle in question was not owned by anyone whom the officer
seized and searched.' Moreover, the Court has in the past not been averse to extend-
ing the reach of warrant exception searches to items owned by third parties.242 Arrests
present such stress that arrestees have been known to take desperate measures.
Randomly reaching into a nearby car, any nearby car, in hopes of finding a weapon,
tire-iron, or other blunt object certainly seems to be within the realm of possibility
- indeed much more likely than Marcus Thornton escaping his handcuffs, exiting
the patrol car, and gaining access to the passenger compartment of his Lincoln
Town Car.243
Rather than avoiding at all costs the ad hoc inquiries that Thornton so feared,
the Court should simply seek to make any such issues straightforward and workable.
The best way to pursue such a course would be to adhere to the rules already estab-
lished and tested in precedent. In such an approach, Belton searches would be limited
to the facts which originally supported Belton - officers would search passenger
compartments of vehicles after making or signaling contact with the motorist while
he or she is still in the car. Justice Stewart, after all, only crafted the bright-line
"passenger compartment" rule in Belton to address the difficulty in applying Chimel
"in specific cases,"" in particular, where an officer was concerned about the
"interior of an automobile" where "the arrestee is its recent occupant." '245
239 Id. (quoting Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982)).
240 Id.
24' Belton, 453 U.S. at 455 (Justice Stewart noted that "the policeman.., discovered that
none of the men owned the vehicle or was related to its owner.").
242 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999) (extending the automobile ex-
ception to include searches of items owned by persons other than the driver of the vehicle).
The Houghton Court upheld the search of a lady's purse found in the car of a male driver,
even though the officer had admitted in testimony that "he had no probable cause to search
(the female passenger) and that men do not usually carry purses." Brief for the Respondent
at 1, Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (No. 98-184).
243 See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 618 (describing Thornton's arrest and placement in the back
seat of the patrol car).
244 Belton, 453 U.S. at 458.
245 Id. at 460.
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According to this reasoning, the Court should have no difficulty in applying
search incident to arrest in situations outside the automobile. It would simply fall
back to the carefully crafted rule originally presented in Chimel. In situations where
an officer met a motorist outside a car, he or she could search incident to arrest the
"arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control." 246 Chimel saw such
a rule as eminently workable. Indeed, Justice Stewart was so comfortable in relying
on officers' ability to determine the area of immediate control that he was ready to
let them assess which desk drawers would be in Chimel' s reach rather than allowing
a "routine[] searching" of "all the desk drawers."24 7 Police, being on the front line,
know best the dangers they face. Chimel exploited this first-hand experience by
allowing officers to summon it in making decisions as to an arrestee's reach. Any
arbitrarily-drawn search power beyond search incident to arrest's original justifi-
cations would thus constitute an unnecessary intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights.
C. Thornton Continued Search Incident to Arrest's Pattern of Expanding Police
Power Beyond its Original Justifications, Making it an Unchallengeable Search
Right
Much of Thornton's reasoning explaining its expansion of official power could
insulate the search incident to arrest exception from future challenge. Such an
approach in search incident to arrest precedent is hardly new, as demonstrated by
Thornton's own citations."' A review of the cases Thornton cited, as well as a
sampling of others it failed to mention, demonstrates that the post-Chimel precedent
was generally directed toward consistent expansion of search incident to arrest.
This is so despite the fact that in any particular case the underlying rationales
increasing police search rights did not themselves need to be consistent.
Thornton's role as part of a larger Court tradition of expanding search incident
to arrest was demonstrated first by Chief Justice Rehnquist's discussion of United
States v. Robinson.249 Thornton relied on Robinson to reject the contention that
"'there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or not there was present
one of the reasons supporting the authority"' to search.250 In Robinson, Officer
Jenks lawfully arrested the defendant for "operating a motor vehicle after the revo-
cation of his operator's permit," a crime carrying a mandatory jail term in the
District of Columbia.25" ' During the search incident to this arrest, Officer Jenks felt
246 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
247 Id.
248 Thornton, 541 U.S. at 620 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973));
id. at 621 (considering Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982)).
249 Id. at 620.
250 Id. (quoting Belton v. New York, 453 U.S. 454, 459 (1981) (quoting Robinson, 414
U.S. at 235)).
251 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220.
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an object in Robinson's left breast pocket.2" 2 Although he "'couldn't tell what it
was,"' the officer reached in Robinson's pocket and recovered a "'crumpled up
cigarette package' in which he found heroin.253 It would have been difficult under
the facts for Officer Jenks to have argued credibly that he worried that the crumpled
cigarette package could hold either a weapon to resist arrest or evidence proving the
crime of driving without a license. The Robinson Court, however, was undaunted
by the lack of such justifications in this particular case.2" Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Robinson Court, declared:
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial
arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evi-
dence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the
probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence
would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.255
The search power instead rested simply on the existence of a legal arrest.256 Once it
is established that the arrest is lawful, "a search incident to arrest requires no addi-
tional justification."257 Thus, the Court in Robinson did not flinch from its recognition
of an absolute rule for search incident to arrest, even when its scope reached further
than Chimel's original justifications.
Robinson's bright-line clarity was abandoned, however, in the very next year in
United States v. Edwards.258 Edwards, however, still offered a kind of consistency by
continuing the expansion of search incident to arrest. In Edwards, the defendant was
arrested and jailed for attempting to break into a post office.259 At the crime scene,
police saw pry marks and paint chips at the point of entry.26" The next morning, police
bought trousers and a shirt for Edwards "to substitute for the clothing which he had
been wearing at the time of and since his arrest.""26 Without a warrant, police
examined his clothing and found "paint chips matching the samples ... taken from the
window." '262 The clothing and paint chip evidence were admitted at trial,263 and the
defendant was convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the
252 Id. at 223.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 235.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 id.
258 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
259 Id. at 801.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 802.
262 Id.
263 id.
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warrantless seizure of Edwards's clothing had occurred "'after the administrative
process and the mechanics of the arrest [had] come to a halt."' 2  The Court, in an
opinion written by Justice White, reversed the Court of Appeals.65
The Edwards Court allowed the search of the inmate's clothing by broadening
search incident to arrest's timing boundaries. Justice White considered it "plain
that searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of the arrest
may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention." '266
As support for this contention, Justice White relied on Abel v. United States,2 67
seeing "little difference" between a search "at the place of arrest" and, "'when the
accused decides to take the property with him,"' a search "'at the first place of
detention when the accused arrives there. '268 Perhaps such a ruling made sense in
Abel, where the defendant, arrested in an espionage case, brought false documents,
including a birth certificate, a certificate of vaccination, and a bank book, with him
to I.N.S. headquarters.2 69 The Abel Court took care to note that the arrestee "took
with him only what he wished. He chose to leave some things behind in his room,
which he voluntarily relinquished."27 Making the same argument in Edwards
seems forced. The property seized and searched in Edwards was the pair of pants
the suspect was wearing when arrested.27' Had Edwards chosen to leave his pants
behind at the place of arrest rather than take them with him to the station, he would
have added a charge of indecent exposure to his woes.
Justice White himself seemed less than comfortable with this reasoning,
offering a second rationale for police delay.22 This additional argument was based
on the particular facts presented in Edwards. The Court of Appeals had viewed the
seizure of Edwards's trousers as occurring "after the administrative mechanics of
arrest [had] been completed" and, therefore, saw the defendant as an incarcerated
prisoner rather than as an arrestee.273 To stave off this change in status, Justice
White characterized the situation as one where "the normal processes incident to
arrest and custody had not been completed when Edwards was placed in his cell. 274
Because it was late at night, and no substitute clothes were yet available, "it would
certainly have been unreasonable for the police to have stripped [Edwards] of his
264 Id. (quoting Edwards v. United States, 474 F.2d 1206, 1211 (6th Cir. 1973)).
265 Id. at 809.
266 Id. at 803.
267 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
268 Edwards, 415 U.S. at 803 (quoting Abel, 362 U.S. at 239).
269 Abel, 362 U.S. at 238-39.
270 Id. at 239.
271 Edwards, 415 U.S. at 802.
272 Id. at 804-05.
273 Id. at 804.
274 Id.
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clothing and left him exposed in his cell throughout the night."2" The delay until
clothes were purchased the next morning was therefore not relevant, for the Court
said of the change of clothes:
This was and is a normal incident of a custodial arrest, and
reasonable delay in effectuating it does not change the fact that
Edwards was no more imposed upon than he could have been at
the time and place of the arrest or immediately upon arrival at
the place of detention.276
One is left to ponder the varying approaches taken by the Court in Robinson and
Edwards. Within the span of one year, the Court went from promoting a bright line
test in Robinson to relying on the particular facts of the case in Edwards. However,
the one constant, a seeming given in search incident to arrest precedent, was the
extension of official right of intrusion.
Such expansion would continue in the Court's next case of this kind, Rawlings
v. Kentucky.277 Unlike Edwards, where the Court expanded the scope of search
incident to arrest to include searches after arrest and incarceration, in Rawlings, the
Court extended the scope of this warrant exception backwards before an actual
arrest.27 In Rawlings, police saw the defendant claim ownership of 1,800 tablets
of LSD.27 9 Police then searched Rawlings, finding "$4,500 in cash in [his] shirt
pocket and a knife in a sheath at [his] side.28" Rawlings later contended that the
money and knife recovered from his person were not found incident to arrest
because police had not formally arrested him until after the search.281 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, made short work of this argument. Justice
Rehnquist wrote, "[T]he police clearly had probable cause" to arrest Rawlings
before the search, and "the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the
challenged search"; therefore, the Court did "not believe it particularly important
that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa. ,212
Extension of search incident to arrest occurred again in Washington v.
Chrisman, a case where the Court returned to making broad rules to cover every
case. 283 In Thornton, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on Chrisman for the blanket
statement that "' [e]very arrest must be presumed to present a risk of danger to the
275 Id. at 805.
276 Id.
277 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
278 Id. at 111.
279 Id. at 101.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 110-11.
282 Id. at 111.
283 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982).
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arresting officer." 284 Chrisman involved an arrest of Carl Overdahl, a student at
Washington State University caught by police leaving a student dormitory "carrying
a half-gallon bottle of gin."2" 5 Hoping to prove he was old enough to consume
alcohol, Overdahl asked if he could retrieve his identification from his dorm room.
286
Officer Daugherty responded that he would have to accompany Overdahl, and both
went to his room on the eleventh floor.287 The officer leaned on the doorjamb when
Overdahl entered, watching both his arrestee and his roommate, Chrisman.288 Officer
Daughtery then noticed "seeds and a small pipe lying on a desk 8 to 10 feet from
where he was standing. 2 89 Suspecting marijuana, Officer Daugherty then entered the
room, inspected, and ultimately recovered the marijuana seeds and pipe.2" Chrisman
was then charged with and convicted of drug offenses.2 9' The Supreme Court of
Washington reversed, ruling that Officer Daugherty had no right to actually enter the
dorm room.292 The state court reasoned that "there was no indication that Overdahl
might obtain a weapon or destroy evidence, and, with the officer blocking the only
exit from the room, his presence inside the room was not necessary to prevent
escape." '293
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, refused to consider the
probable lack of danger stemming from an arrest of a college drinker or the slim
chances of escape from an eleven-by-seventeen foot room on the eleventh floor.294
The Chrisman Court declared that "an arresting officer's custodial authority over
an arrested person does not depend upon a reviewing court's after-the-fact assess-
ment of the particular arrest situation." '295 The Court therefore held that "it is not
'unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer, as a matter of
routine, to monitor the movements of an arrested person, as his judgment dictates,
following the arrest., 296 Once again, the Court upheld a search without concerning
itself about whether the justifications originally advanced for it actually existed.
Indeed, it openly declared the lack of need for any such inquiry.
284 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615,621 (2004) (quoting Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 7).
285 Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 3.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 id.
289 Id. at 4.
290 id.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 5.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 3, 7.
295 Id. at 7.
296 id.
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Finally, in 1998, the Court placed a limit on search incident to arrest - by
requiring that it occur only when an arrest actually exists.2 97 In Knowles v. Iowa,
a police officer stopped Patrick Knowles for speeding forty-three miles per hour in
a twenty-five miles per hour zone.2 98 Iowa law empowered the officer either to
arrest Knowles for speeding or merely issue him a citation and allow him to go on
his way.2 99 An Iowa statute further provided that "the issuance of a citation in lieu
of an arrest 'does not affect the officer's authority to conduct an otherwise lawful
search."'3 0 The Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, was
therefore confronted with the issue of whether officers could conduct a search
incident to arrest in situations lacking any custodial arrest.30'
The Court in Knowles refused to go so far.302 Such a course would detach
completely the search incident to arrest exception from its original rationales.3 3
The entire point of the police right to search incident to arrest was the "danger to
the police officer" which "flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant
proximity, stress, and uncertainty."3" In contrast, people experiencing a mere Terry
stop would be "less hostile to the police."3 5 Thus, a citation would not implicate
the first rationale of "officer safety."30 6 The second basis for search incident to
arrest for traffic citations was equally lacking, for detainees were "less likely to take
conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence."30 7 Finally, in this
case, Chief Justice Rehnquist doubted whether any "further evidence of excessive
speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger
compartment of the car."308
The Knowles Court bolstered its refusal to extend search incident to arrest by
listing for police "other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect
297 Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 113 (1998).
298 Id. at 114.
299 Id. The Court specified that an Iowa statute provided that "Iowa peace officers having
cause to believe that a person has violated any traffic or motor vehicle equipment law may
arrest the person and immediately take the person before a magistrate." Id. at 115. See IOWA
CODE ANN. § 321.485(1)(a) (West 1997). Further, the Knowles Court noted that "Iowa law
also authorizes the far more usual practice of issuing a citation in lieu of arrest or in lieu of
continued custody after an initial arrest." Knowles, 525 U.S. at 115. See IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 805.1(1) (West Supp. 1997).
300 Knowles, 525 U.S. at 115 (quoting IOWA CODE ANN. § 805.1(4) (West Supp. 1997)).
30 Id. at 114.
302 Id. at 118-19.
303 See id. at 117-19.
'04 Id. at 117 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973)).
"' Id. (quoting Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973)).
306 Id.
307 Id. (quoting Cupp, 412 U.S. at 296).
30 Id. at 118.
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themselves from danger."30 9 Officers had an automatic right to order both drivers
and passengers out of lawfully stopped vehicles.310 Police further were allowed to
"pat down" any driver or passenger whom they had "reasonable suspicion" might
be "armed and dangerous," and such a search could include the passenger compart-
ment of a vehicle.3 ' Such protections would make any extension of search incident
to arrest unnecessary.
Knowles's list of search options for police who genuinely sense peril calls into
question Thornton's perceptions of danger for police in approaching persons already
outside their vehicles. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms,312 one of the cases Knowles men-
tioned as creating alternative search rights for police, the Court held that "a police
officer may as a matter of course order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his
vehicle. '313 In Mimms, the State "freely concede[d]" that there was "nothing unusual
or suspicious" about the driver's behavior in the case, and so the officer "had no
reason to suspect foul play" in the particular traffic stop.3"4 The government, however,
highlighted the need to allow the order-out practice in all cases so as to protect officer
safety.315 It urged that "[e]stablishing a face-to-face confrontation" by ordering the
driver out of the car "diminishes the possibility, otherwise substantial, that the driver
can make unobserved movements; this, in turn, reduces the likelihood that the officer
will be the victim of an assault., 316 The Mimms Court flatly stated, "We think it too
plain for argument that the State's proffered justification - the safety of the officer
- is both legitimate and weighty. '317 The Court noted that one study found "approxi-
mately 30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect
seated in an automobile. 'al" The Mimms holding was, therefore, based on the life-or-
death distinction between dealing with suspects when inside or outside a vehicle.
When inside, detainees can hide furtive movements and procure hidden weapons;
when outside, they cannot.
The difference between suspects inside a car and outside a car impressed the
Court so greatly that, in Maryland v. Wilson,319 it extended police order-out rights
to cover passengers as well as the driver. In Wilson, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who
309 Id. at 117.
310 Id. at 117-18 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977); Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,414-15 (1997)).
311 Knowles, 525 U.S. at 118 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983)).
312 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
313 Wilson, 519 U.S. at 410 (citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 106).
314 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109.
315 Id. at 110.
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 id.
319 519 U.S. 408, 409 (1997).
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authored the Court's opinion, determined that "the same weighty interest in officer
safety is present regardless of whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver
or passenger."32 The Court in Wilson therefore held, "[A]n officer making a traffic
stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop."32'
Mimms' and Wilson's bright line between persons inside and outside a vehicle
suddenly disappeared in Thornton, where, "[i]n all relevant aspects, the arrest of a
suspect who is next to a vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer safety
... as the arrest of one who is inside the vehicle." '322 Chief Justice Rehnquist's
language on this point could not be stronger. He did not dither by saying that the
situations were similar or shared characteristics - he declared that they were
"identical. 323 This is in spite of the fact that the Chief Justice wrote the Court's
opinion in both Wilson and Thornton. The official right of intrusion grew in both
cases, despite the complete contradiction in the underlying rationales.
Still another search option mentioned in Knowles effectively undermined
Thornton's rationale. In refusing to allow search incident to arrest when no actual
arrest existed, the Knowles Court allayed fears of danger to officers by recalling that
Terry v. Ohio324 and Michigan v. Long3 25 ensured officer safety by allowing pat
downs of persons or passenger compartments whenever officers had "reasonable
suspicion" that the person they were confronting was "armed and dangerous. '326
When crafting this rule, the Court in Terry was acutely aware of the dangers facing
police. Terry recognized that "American criminals have a long tradition of armed
violence, and every year in this country many law enforcement officers are killed
in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded., 327 The Terry Court therefore
refused to "blind" itself to "the need for law enforcement officers to protect them-
selves and other prospective victims of violence .... , 328
Despite this deep concern for officer safety, the Terry Court chose to forgo
creating a bright-line right to search detainees. Chief Justice Warren, writing for
the Court in Terry, explicitly rejected a "rigid all-or-nothing model" for deciding
law enforcement's right to search.329 Instead, Terry struck a balance between the
important competing interests by creating a "narrowly drawn authority to permit a
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has
320 Id. at 413.
321 Id. at415.
322 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 621 (2004).
323 Id.
324 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
325 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
326 Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998).
327 Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
321 Id. at 24.
329 Id. at 17.
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reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual... ."30
Thus, the Terry Court empowered officers, trained in the skills of assessing danger
in the field, the opportunity to rely on their own perceptions and judgments in
determining whether to perform pat downs."' Chief Justice Warren gave police the
chance to apply their own experience and expertise in forming reasonable suspicion
for a Terry search.332 Thus, regardless of the decision in Thornton, officers reasonably
sensing danger already had the right to pat down suspects for weapons.333 Thornton's
extension of Belton to unknown limits, therefore, should not be necessary to preserve
officer safety.
CONCLUSION
Thornton constitutes the Court's latest expansion in a long line of precedent of
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. After its struggle
in Chimel to link the scope of search incident to arrest to its original justifications,
the Court, with the rare exception,3 4 has incrementally increased this official power
of intrusion. Such a trend is natural, if not inevitable. Once a search right is crafted
to protect police, who would be brave enough, or perhaps cold and harsh enough,
to limit such a rule ensuring the safety of those who risk their lives by protecting the
citizenry? It is little wonder, then, that the justices who do muster the courage to
question expanding search incident to arrest often are writing dissents.
The voices of these dissenting justices are instructive here, for they anticipate, in
some measure, the dangers created by the reasoning employed in Thornton. Once the
Fourth Amendment is framed in terms of the interests of the officer as against those
of the criminal, there might be a tendency to side with the protectors of societal order.
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, in their dissenting opinion in Rabinowitz, essentially
acknowledged the distaste involved in overturning convictions of the guilty in order
to protect the Fourth Amendment.33 5 Justice Frankfurter noted, "It is a fair summary
of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in con-
troversies involving not very nice people." '336 He cautioned that "while we are
concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of
what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment. A disregard of
the historic materials underlying the Amendment does not answer them. '" 337
330 Id. at 27.
331 See id. at 27, 30.
332 See id. at 23.
133 Id. at 30.
334 See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 114 (1998).
... United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68-69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
336 Id. at 69.
337 Id.
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Lacking such discipline, the Court runs the risk of losing sight of the original
warrant mandate and the narrowness of its exceptions. Such a problem has particularly
plagued the search incident to arrest exception, for it has suffered the "progressive
distortion" of starting as a "hint" which became a "suggestion," and then "loosely
turned into dictum and finally [was] elevated to a decision." '338 Such a "precarious
foundation" '339 has allowed unchecked expansion of the search incident to arrest
exception. This, in turn, has resulted in making "the arrest an incident to an unwar-
ranted search instead of a warrantless search an incident to an arrest."'
Such a standard, or lack thereof, might harm the intended beneficiaries of the
search incident to arrest rule. Once the Court, as in Thornton, moved beyond the
hoped-for clarity of the Belton rule, it created uncertainty as to the exception's outer
limits. This could cause confusion for the officer in the field. In the end, Thornton's
rule "offers no guidance to the police officer seeking to work out these answers for
himself"34' This could lead to the unfortunate result seen by Justice Brennan in his
Belton dissent that the 'bright-line' rule fails on its own terms." '34 2
Thornton might not only have crafted a failed rule, but also have contributed,
in its small way, to making it an eternal search right. Regardless of its original
merit, the search incident to arrest exception has tended to gain in girth and strength
each time the Court has looked at it. As Justice Murphy wrote in his Harris dissent,
"What has heretofore been a carefully circumscribed exception to the prohibition
against searches without warrants has now been inflated into a comprehensive
principle of freedom from all the requirements of the Fourth Amendment." '343 With
this dynamic in Fourth Amendment litigation playing out once again in Thornton,
it would thus be wise for anyone seeking to avoid the grim reaper to come back, not
as a government program, but as a search incident to arrest.
338 Id. at 75. Justice Frankfurter further characterized search of a place incident to arrest
as "an innovation based on confusion, without historic foundation, and made in the teeth of
a historic protection against it." Id. at 79.
... Id. at 76 (referring to dicta in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)).
340 Id. at 80.
34' New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,470 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
342 Id. at 469.
343 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 191 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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